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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the role of groups and networks in helping poor Filipinos 
manage their exposure to risks and cope with shocks. It brings together two 
strands of literature that examine how social capital affects economic variables and 
investigate the processes by which social capital formation, participation in 
networks and groups, and trusting behavior comes about. Using a longitudinal 
study from a province in Northern Mindanao, Philippines, the authors find that 
households belong to a number of formal and informal groups and networks, but 
participation differs according to household characteristics. Households belonging to 
the lower asset quartiles belong to fewer groups, and households with more human 
and physical capital have larger social networks. Furthermore, wealthier households 
are more likely to take part in productive groups while membership in civic and 
religious groups is not limited by economic status. Migrant networks play an 
important risk-smoothing role via remittances sent by migrant daughters. 
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SHOCKS, GROUPS, AND NETWORKS IN BUKIDNON, 
PHILIPPINES 
Agnes R. Quisumbing,
1 Scott McNiven, and Marie Godquin 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Belonging to a group is highly valued in Filipino society. Personalism, familism, and 
other values supportive of harmonious relationships in small groups, and the 
individual’s personal network of selected relatives and other allies affect how 
Filipinos function in organizations (Arce, 2003). Whether Filipino organizational 
culture is compatible with development objectives has been debated in the 
Philippines since more “impersonal and more universal values such as the merit 
principle and the rationality of procedures in the Weberian sense” are not viewed as 
central to the Filipino organizational culture (Arce, 2003:1). Do local institutions 
have an instrumental value beyond their contribution to an individual’s sense of 
belonging?  
This study takes a broad perspective on different types of collective action in 
the rural Philippines, examining the role of groups and networks in helping the poor 
manage their exposure to risks and cope with shocks to their livelihoods. It brings 
together two strands of the social capital literature: the literature that examines 
how social capital, variously measured, affects economic variables (Pender and 
Scherr, 2002; Haddad and Maluccio, 2003; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999) and 
studies that investigate the processes by which social capital formation, 
participation in networks and groups, and trusting behavior comes about 
(Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007, Haddad and Maluccio, 2003). Specifically, the paper 
attempts to answer the following questions: 
1.  What kinds of shocks do rural households face? How do these shocks 
affect per capita consumption, and does the impact of shocks differ 
according to household characteristics? 
2.  What kind of formal and informal groups and networks do households 
join? Does exposure to risk encourage membership in such groups and 
networks? 
3.  What are the returns to membership in formal and informal groups and 
networks? 
Underlying these questions is the issue of heterogeneity. By examining 
different types of collective action institutions in the Philippines—local formal groups 
and informal networks, and migrant networks composed of family members—we 
attempt to understand: 
4.  How does heterogeneity affect network formation and risk-smoothing; 
and 
5.  How do groups and networks use different mechanisms to enforce 
behavior in order to achieve their risk-smoothing objectives? 
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For this paper, we investigate two types of social capital: formal, 
proxied/measured by membership in groups, and informal, proxied/measured by 
the size of trust-based networks. Both groups and networks can be local or spatially 
diversified. We take this broader view of network formation—looking beyond the 
village as the locus of network activity—in the light of recent studies (Munshi and 
Rosenzweig, 2005) that have begun to question the assumption that the 
appropriate unit of risk-smoothing is the village (Townsend, 1994). Munshi and 
Rosenzweig (2005) find that, in India, consumption is smoothed within sub caste 
networks, which extend beyond the village. Indeed, the literature on migration and 
remittances suggests that networks can cross geographic boundaries, with the 
formation of migrant networks in the destination being affected by shocks in the 
origin locality (Munshi, 2003) and remittances, and return migration being 
influenced by shocks in destination localities (Yang, 2006). This literature is 
especially relevant to the Philippines given the importance of both internal and 
external migration as a livelihood strategy (Quisumbing and McNiven, 2005, 2006). 
Other studies have also found that the problems of asymmetric information 
and limited commitment mean that households are not likely to be fully insured 
against adverse shocks (Ligon et al., 2000; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2000). 
However, such analyses do not assess whether responses differ depending on the 
nature of the shock, and indicators for collective action and participation in different 
types of networks are generally either absent or rudimentary. For example, would 
norms of reciprocity—which are likely to characterize networks of close relatives—
be more effective in enforcing risk-sharing commitments compared to more formal 
agreements entered into by members of credit groups? A study undertaken in the 
Cordillera region of the Philippines (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003) shows that risk-
sharing appears to occur mostly in very small networks of close friends and 
families—networks in which enforcement may be easier, but which may not have 
the heterogeneity required to efficiently share risk. 
While heterogeneity may be important for risk-sharing, in most empirical 
studies of its impact on collective action or on household incomes directly, the 
impact of any type of heterogeneity tends to be negative, or not significant (Ahuja, 
1998; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Bardhan, 2000; McCarthy and Vanderlinden, 
2003; Place et al., 2004), with the interesting exception of results reported in 
Grootaert (2001) for studies in Burkina Faso, Bolivia, and Indonesia. It is often 
hypothesized that heterogeneity of any sort makes finding agreements mutually 
beneficial and acceptable to all more costly, and that sociocultural heterogeneity in 
particular is likely to reduce trust among group members and also to reduce the 
efficacy of social sanctioning (Easterly and Levine, 1997). On the other hand, much 
of the literature on group formation and networks highlights the added benefits to 
diversity (or heterogeneity) among members along any number of dimensions. 
Risk-pooling will certainly be more efficient when one’s income is less correlated 
with other members in the group. Many networks exist to share information, and 
there may be economies of scope in terms of information gathering or accumulation 
of other assets. In this case, economic heterogeneity also favors pooling of 
resources to the benefit of all. Because there may be competing impacts of different 
types of heterogeneity on the functioning of groups, it becomes critical to examine 
which groups are able to harness the positive, and mitigate the negative effects, of 
heterogeneity, especially with respect to those groups serving the poor.  
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Finally, if groups differ in terms of degree of heterogeneity and geographic 
dispersion, what kinds of enforcement mechanisms are used to ensure compliance 
to network objectives and norms of behavior? Members of local networks are easier 
to monitor, but local networks are less able to insure against covariate shocks. 
Spatially diversified networks offer some protection against covariate shocks, but 
network members will be more difficult to monitor. If information and 
communications technologies are poor, more distant network members may not 
even be aware of a shock that occurred in their origin communities. 
This chapter attempts to address these issues using rich longitudinal data 
and qualitative studies from Bukidnon, Philippines. We first describe the data, the 
context, and the types of shocks faced by rural households. We then examine their 
impacts on log per capita consumption, and whether these impacts vary across 
different types of households. We then compare and contrast the determinants of 
membership in groups and in informal networks, focusing on the role of initial 
wealth and heterogeneity in the accumulation of social capital. We then examine 
the returns to membership in two types of groups—formal groups and migrant 
networks—on various indicators of well-being. We conclude with some reflections 
on the effectiveness of local and migrant networks for enabling asset accumulation 
and consumption-smoothing. 
2. DATA AND CONTEXT 
Our data come from a longitudinal study conducted by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Research Institute for Mindanao Culture, Xavier 
University (RIMCU) of households residing in southern Bukidnon, a landlocked 
province in Northern Mindanao, comprising 20 municipalities and two cities, 
Malaybalay and Valencia (see Figure 1). Since Bukidnon is landlocked, it relies on 
Cagayan de Oro, the major metropolitan center in Northern Mindanao, as its 
nearest seaport. 
The original survey in 1984/85 investigated the effects of agricultural 
commercialization on the nutrition and household welfare of these rural families. In 
1977, the Bukidnon Sugar Company (BUSCO) began operating a sugar mill in the 
area, which had previously been dominated by subsistence corn production. The 
presence of the mill gave farmers the opportunity to adopt this cash crop, 
depending on their proximity to the mill. The survey was fielded in four rounds at 
four-month intervals from August 1984 to December 1985 so that each round 
corresponded to a different agricultural season. The survey contained information 
on food and nonfood consumption expenditure, agricultural production, income, 
asset ownership, credit use, anthropometry and morbidity, education, and 24-hour 
food consumption recall. The initial sample included 510 households, although 448 
households were interviewed in all four rounds. Bouis and Haddad (1990) provide a 
detailed description of the sample design and survey area. 
Following qualitative studies conducted in the study communities in early 
2003, IFPRI and RIMCU returned to conduct two rounds of quantitative data 
collection using a survey questionnaire that closely reflected the one used in 
1984/85. The first wave of data collection in the fall of 2003 interviewed all original  
 
4 
respondents still living in the survey area. We were able to contact 311, or 61 
percent, of the original respondents.
2 The respondents listed all children who lived 
away from home, providing contact information for non-co resident children. We 
sampled at random up to two non-co resident children living in or near the origin 
household’s village, yielding 261 households.  
Figure 1. Map of the Philippines, indicating study area 
 
                                                      
 
2 Godquin and Quisumbing (2007) model the determinants of the probability of being re-
interviewed in 2003. They find that older households are less likely to be re-interviewed. The 
percentage of households affected by peace and order problems also contributes to the non-interview 
probability. However, households with a larger share of female working members in 1984 are more 
likely to be re-interviewed. Also, the proportion of non-attriters in the barangay between the first and 
fourth survey rounds in 1984/85 is associated with higher re-interview probabilities. We do not find 
significant impacts of attrition on estimated coefficients for the set of outcomes we consider 
(participation in groups).   
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The second wave of data collection began in April 2004 and ended in July 
2004. In this wave, the survey team interviewed any household formed by children 
who no longer live in their origin barangays.
3 This included a large group of 
households in three major urban areas in Mindanao (Valencia, the commercial 
center of Bukidnon, Malaybalay, the provincial capital, and Cagayan de Oro, the 
major metropolitan area in northern Mindanao) as well as many households in 
poblaciones (municipality seats) and other rural areas of Bukidnon. The sample size 
from this migrant wave consisted of 257 households—about 75 percent of potential 
migrants to be interviewed. Figure 2 presents a map of the survey area and the 
locations of original households, households formed by children in the original 
barangays, and households formed by children who migrated. While budgetary 
concerns did not allow us to interview all children, the survey nonetheless contains 
data on children who migrated to a variety of rural and urban locations. The initial 
interview with the parents obtained a basic set of information about all children, 
including location, educational attainment, and marital status. Obtaining this 
information from parents, plus assiduous follow-up of migrants and children 
residing in the community, avoided the common problem of sample selection bias if 
interviews were based only on residence rules (Rosenzweig, 2003). The analysis in 
this paper is based on 305 of the 311 parent households for whom we have 
complete data.  
                                                      
 
3 Historically, barangays are relatively small communities of 50 to 100 families. Most villages have 
30 to 100 houses and the population varies from 100 to 500 persons (Constantino, 1975).  
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Figure 2. Sampled child and village household counts 
 
Table 1 presents selected household characteristics of parents who were re-
interviewed in 2003. The household head was 55 years old in 2003. Reflecting 
changes over the life-cycle, household sizes have decreased from 6.8 persons in 
1984 to 5.8 in 2003, and dependency ratios have markedly decreased from 1.66 to 
0.49. Agriculture seems to have become less important to parents as they aged: 
while 91 percent of parent households were engaged in agricultural production in 
1984, only 71 percent remain active in agriculture, many of them having divested 
themselves of land. Only 33 percent of parent households had no land in 1984 
(whether owned or rented), whereas 61 percent of parent households no longer 
have owned or cultivated land in 2003. This should not be interpreted as 
impoverishment of parent households since parents typically bestow land to 
children when the latter marry, not when the parents die. The average area 
cultivated in 1984 was 3.17 hectares; in 2003, the number was 3.09 hectares.   
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Table 1. Characteristics of parent households, 1984 and 2003
4 
  Parent households 
  n=305 
  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Age of the household head    
Age in 1984  36.31 8.19 
Age in 2003  54.67 7.63 
Years of schooling of head    
Years of schooling in 1984  5.73 3.14 
Years of schooling in 2003  6.12 6.07 
Household size    
Household size in 1984  6.83 2.44 
Household size in 2003  5.84 2.74 
Dependency ratio    
Dependency ratio in 1984  1.66 0.84 
Dependency ratio in 2003  0.49 0.62 
Proportion of agricultural 
households    
Proportion of agricultural households 
in 1984  0.91 0.28 
Proportion of agricultural households 
in 2003  0.71 0.45 
Proportion with no land    
Proportion with no land in 1984  0.33 0.47 
Proportion with no land in 2003  0.61 0.49 
Area cultivated    
Area cultivated in 1984 (hectares)  3.17 4.07 
Area cultivated in 2003 (hectares)  3.09 7.27 
3. SHOCKS IN BUKIDNON, PHILIPPINES. 
We define shocks as adverse events that lead to a loss of household income, a 
reduction in consumption, a loss of productive assets, and/or serious 
concern/anxiety about household welfare. Similar to the Ethiopia case study 
(Dercon et al., 2008), data used in this section are based on a household-level 
“shocks” module developed in Hoddinott and Quisumbing (2003). The module asks 
households to consider a list of adverse events and indicate whether the household 
was adversely affected by them.  
                                                      
 
4 Note: Descriptive statistics based on 305 parent households in the regression sample and 261 
children living in the same communities.  
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Shocks are divided into a number of broad categories: agroclimatic, 
economic, political/social/legal, crime, and health. Agroclimatic shocks include 
drought and flooding, but also erosion and pestilence affecting crops or livestock. 
Economic shocks include problems in terms of access to inputs (both physical 
access and large increases in price), decreases in output prices, and difficulties in 
selling agricultural and nonagricultural products. Political/social/legal shocks in the 
Philippines include the implementation of land reform (its coverage was expanded 
beyond rice and corn areas in 1987) and an uncertain peace and order situation 
due to military conflict, as well as contract disputes.
5 Crime shocks include the theft 
and/or destruction of crops, livestock, housing, tools or household durables as well 
as crimes against persons. Peace and order shocks include perceptions of general 
crime risk and military activity. Health shocks include both death and illness. We 
also consider miscellaneous shocks such as conflicts and disputes with other family 
members, neighbors, or other village residents regarding access to land or other 
assets. Finally, in addition to these questions about specific shocks, households 
were also asked to enumerate the three most important adverse shocks that they 
had experienced over the past 18 years. These are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. Household self-reports of the worst shocks experienced between 
1984-2003, Bukidnon, Philippines 
 
Parent households in 
regression 
Drought 38.7 
Crop pests and diseases  27.5 
Illness or disability of head, spouse, other person 
(including hospitalization)  31.8 
Death of head, spouse, other person  23.6 
Other weather (humidity, floods, winds, fires)  13.8 
Crime/peace and order  12.8 
Input shocks (lack of financing, high input 
process) 7.5 
Livestock disease and deaths  5.6 
Political shocks (property rights and contract 
disputes) 5.3 
Divorce and abandonment  2.0 
Output shocks (lack of demand for output) and 
unemployment  1.6 
Number of households  305 
 
The proportion of households reporting shocks is sizeable. Eighty-eight 
percent of parent households in the Philippines reported a most important shock, 
52 percent a second most important shock, and 15 percent a third most important 
                                                      
 
5 Land reform would be an adverse event for landowners who lose land to the program and a 
positive event to beneficiaries. However, the implementation of the program did create uncertainty 
regarding property rights, which eventually affected investment decisions.   
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shock. Drought is the most important shock reported by parents (38.7 percent 
reporting), followed by illness or disability (31.8 percent) and crop pests and 
diseases (27.5 percent). Death of a spouse or other household member is also 
important—it is mentioned by 23.6 percent of households. Parent households also 
report other weather-related factors (humidity, floods, high winds, fires) (13.8 
percent ) as well as crime and peace and order shocks (12.8 percent) as among 
their worst shocks. Because shocks reporting may be subject to respondent bias 
(for example, wealthier people have more assets that can be stolen, and thus may 
be more likely to report theft and crime shocks, or have more livestock that can be 
affected by diseases), in the empirical work we use village-level measures of most 
shocks, except for illness and death shocks, for which we use household-level 
reports. 
4. SHOCKS IN THE RURAL PHILIPPINES: AN ECONOMETRIC ASSESSMENT 
While the discussion in Section 3 provides a detailed overview of the types of 
shocks experienced by households, it does not give us a quantitative sense of their 
consequences, nor if these consequences vary depending on wealth, schooling, and 
other observable household characteristics. For these reasons, we report an 
econometric assessment of the impact of these shocks on one measure of welfare, 
log per capita consumption.
6 
Log of per capita consumption (lnpcexp) of household i in village v in time t 
is a function of two broad sets of household characteristics: household 
characteristics observed in the past (time t-1) (Hiv, t-1) and shocks to households 
experienced between time t-1 and time t(Siv, t). Vectors of parameters to be 
estimated are γ, β, and κ. The dependent variable is measured in 2003, while 
regressors are 1984 values of household characteristics. Denoting εiv, t as the 
white noise disturbance term, we write this relationship as 
 
 lnpcexpiv,  t  =  γ · Hiv, t-1 + β · Siv, t + κ · Xiv, t + εiv, t . (1) 
 
Observable household characteristics are characteristics of the head (age, 
sex, and schooling), demographic household characteristics (log size and 
dependency ratio), and household wealth. We do not include sex of the household 
head in the regressions because none of the households were female-headed in 
1984. Household wealth is proxied by area cultivated in hectares and the value of 
                                                      
 
6 The consumption variable is constructed in the following fashion. Food and nonfood consumption 
were covered in separate modules in the questionnaire. For each food item, households were asked 
about the amounts they had consumed out of purchases, consumption out of own stock, and 
consumption from gifts and wages in-kind in the last week. With the exception of consumption of own 
produce and gifts, which were valued using prices obtained from local market, surveys fielded at the 
same time as the household survey; expenditures on purchased food were reported as is. Nonfood 
items are limited to non-investment goods so that we include consumables such as matches, 
batteries, soap, kerosene and the like, clothing, and transport but exclude investments in durable 
goods such as housing. Different recall periods were used for different items; for comparability all are 




net worth. Dummy variables for the head being Catholic (the dominant religious 
group) and having been born in Misamis Oriental are included. Having been born in 
Misamis Oriental, where the region’s metropolitan center is located, may indicate 
better connections for business and commerce. Dummy variables are included for 
each municipality in the Philippines. The implication is that shocks are identified by 
within-municipality variation, which may make identification of covariate shocks 
difficult. Nevertheless, while covariate shocks are found in virtually all 
municipalities, there is no single municipality where drought affected all households 
unilaterally. Both factors appear to allow identification of the impact of these 
relatively covariate events in our data. These consumption regressions are 
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS); note that while we have longitudinal 
data, we use past values as control variables instead of estimating a panel data 
model.  
The shocks data consist of dummy variables on each type of shock reported 
by each household, such as whether the household experienced drought, and 
therefore do not indicate the severity of the shock. To minimize respondent bias 
and to obtain some indicator of severity of shocks, we aggregate common shocks in 
the following categories by using the percentage of households in the village 
affected by: a drought; too much rain, pests or diseases that affected field crops or 
crops in storage; pests or diseases that affected livestock; difficulty in obtaining 
inputs or increases in input prices; inability to sell or decreases in output prices; 
and peace and order problems. We use the more general “peace and order” 
problems instead of crime and theft shocks, since the latter is more likely to be 
tainted by respondent bias. Illness and death shocks are disaggregated into illness 
of the head/spouse, illness of another household member, death of the 
head/spouse, and death of another household member. 
Table 3 presents regression results showing the impact of shocks and other 
covariates on log consumption per capita in Bukidnon, Philippines, controlling for 
household characteristics in 1984, and disaggregating on the basis of landholdings, 
net worth, and years of schooling in 1984. The percentage of households affected by 
drought—henceforth a drought shock, for brevity—decreases per capita consumption 
by 11 percent for all households. However, it is clear that the impact of shocks differs 
greatly across types of households.   
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7 Notes:  
Regressions included control variables as of 1984: log of age of the household head, years of schooling of the head, log of household size, 
dependency ratio, net worth, area cultivated, whether household head was Catholic, and whether the head was born in Misamis Oriental. 
Standard errors are calculated using the Huber-White method; municipality dummies are included but not reported. A constant term was 
estimated but not reported. 
*Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
***Signficant at the 1% level 
Whether or not a household had land in 1984 refers to whether they had either owned or rented land 
Median land size in 1984 was 1.75 hectares 
Median net worth in 1984 was 7,580 pesos 
Median years of schooling of the household head in 1984 was 6 years 
 
 
All households  No land in 1984 















schooling, 1984   
   Coeff t  Coeff t  Coeff t  Coeff t  Coeff t  Coeff t  Coeff  t  Coeff t  Coeff  t 
Shocks between 1984-2003 
Percent of households in village affected by 
Drought -0.11 
-
1.92**  -0.14  -1.38 -0.10  -0.90 -0.20 
-
3.90*** -0.03  -0.44  -0.16 
-
2.28**  -0.04  -0.38 -0.05  -0.32 -0.27 
-
5.81*** 
Excessive rain or flooding  0.10  1.38  0.06  0.60  0.05  0.43  0.12  1.67*  -0.01  -0.07  -0.08  -1.54  0.12  0.68  -0.19  -0.67  0.20  1.60 
Crop/livestock 
pests/diseases  0.04 1.18 -0.13  -3.15**  0.11 2.71***  -0.10 
-
3.98*** 0.10  2.73*** -0.06  -1.26  0.12  2.70*** 0.08  1.95*  0.03  0.74 
Input  shocks  0.03 0.09 1.17 3.03***  -0.41  -0.50 0.45 1.24  -0.35  -0.63 0.28 1.09 -0.56  -0.75 -0.96 
-
2.86*** 1.27  3.60*** 
Output  shocks  0.16 1.04 0.32 1.36  0.10 0.48  0.05 0.33  0.11 0.31  0.23 0.90 0.22  1.23  0.23 0.56  -0.09  -0.52 
Peace and order problems  -0.04  -0.54  -0.01  -0.05 -0.04  -0.19 0.05 0.52  -0.25  -0.87 0.15 0.88 -0.20  -0.73 0.30 0.63  -0.13  -1.31 
Idiosyncratic shocks 
Death of head or spouse  -0.07  -0.67  0.35  1.24  -0.20  -2.11**  0.33  1.43  -0.30 
-
3.80***  -0.14 -0.85 -0.11  -1.03  -0.18 -1.49  0.03 0.18 
Death  of  another  person  0.08 0.97 0.43 3.52**  0.01 0.04  0.19 1.64  0.01 0.04  0.13 1.28 -0.06  -0.56 0.09 0.87  0.08  0.60 
Illness of head or spouse  0.18  1.39  -0.04  -0.25  0.27  1.46  -0.03  -0.27  0.36  1.42  0.05  0.50  0.08  0.36  0.06  0.66  0.36  1.60 
Illness of another person  0.10  1.45  -0.02  -0.11  0.09  0.71  0.09  0.52  0.20  1.29  -0.01  -0.07  0.27  1.38  0.10  0.83  0.11  0.88  
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Drought shocks have the greatest impact on households whose landholdings 
are below the median land size and households with below median net worth of 
assets, and surprisingly, on households with greater than median levels of 
schooling. Crop and livestock pests and diseases significantly reduce consumption 
of households without land in 1984 and households with landholdings below the 
median size, but increase consumption of households with land, households with 
above median landholding size, and households with above median net worth. 
Input shocks reduce per capita consumption of those with less than median 
schooling, but increase it for those with above median schooling and those with no 
land in 1984. It is possible that these households are less likely to be engaged in 
agriculture and are in fact net suppliers of labor (in the case of those with no land) 
and other inputs (for those with above median schooling, who could be engaged in 
nonagricultural occupations). Output shocks do not appear to affect per capita 
consumption significantly. 
Death and illness are shocks that are truly idiosyncratic. Both death and 
illness are disaggregated depending on whether death (illness) occurred for the 
household head or spouse, or for another household member. We find that death of 
the head or spouse significantly reduces log consumption per capita for households 
that had land in 1984 and for households above the median landholding size in 
1984. Households who have more land were probably engaged in agricultural 
production, so their consumption is more vulnerable to the loss of an adult working 
member, particularly either the head or spouse. In contrast, death of another 
person increased per capita consumption for households without land. This may 
simply be an artifact of construction of the dependent variable—death reduces 
household size and therefore the denominator of the dependent variable. Illness did 
not significantly affect consumption on the aggregate and across household types.  
The above analysis does not allow one to examine whether shocks have long-
term and persistent impacts. Because the interval between survey rounds is close 
to twenty years, one would expect substantial heterogeneity of impact across such 
a long time period. To account for the possibility that timing of shocks matters, we 
divide our shocks recall period into two intervals: the first interval, 1984-1996, 
corresponds to the period before the most recent El Nino event and the Asian 
economic crisis (1997-1998), while the second interval, 1997-2003, includes the 
recent El Nino and the period of the Asian economic crisis and recovery. A drought 
shock also occurred in the earlier interval, in 1987-88. 
Table 4 presents regressions on log per capita consumption, with shocks 
disaggregated into the two intervals, before and after the recent El Nino and the 
Asian economic crisis. Similar to Table 3, these regressions include controls for age 
and education of the household head, household size, dependency ratio, whether 
the head was Catholic, and whether he or she was born in Misamis Oriental. In the 
regression for all households, the 1987-1988 drought had a larger and more 
persistent negative impact than the recent drought, indicating that drought 
response mechanisms may have improved in recent years.  
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Table 4. Impact of shocks by timing of shock and by household characteristics on (log) consumption per capita, 
Bukidnon, Philippines, 2003, parent households only (n=350) 
 
  All households 
No land in 
1984   
Had land in 
1984  Below median   Above median  Below median  Above median  Below median  Above median 






1984  schooling, 1984 
   Coeff  t Coeff  t Coeff  t Coeff  t Coeff  t Coeff  t Coeff  t Coeff  t  Coeff  t 
Shocks between 1997-2003 
Percent of households in village affected by: 
Drought 0.00  -0.16  0.01  0.15  -0.03  -0.80  -0.01  -0.20  -0.08 
-
3.36***  0.01 0.23  -0.03  -0.59 0.01  0.21  -0.04 -1.03 
Excessive rain or flooding  0.01  0.33  0.08  0.45  0.07  0.92  0.06  0.58  0.06  0.71  0.05  0.94  0.10  0.94  -0.25 
-
1.89* 0.07  0.63 
Crop/livestock 
pests/diseases  0.02 0.85  0.03  0.55 0.03 0.62 -0.05  -1.01  0.07  1.29 0.03 0.78 0.03 0.55  0.09  1.65*  0.00 -0.04 
Input shocks  -0.05  -0.44  (dropped)       -0.56 
-
2.91*** 0.06  0.16  -0.94 
-
4.52*** 0.05  0.18  -0.62 
-
2.38*** -0.60 -1.39  0.78  3.53*** 
Output shocks  0.03  0.26  -0.30  -1.79*  -0.05  -0.82  -0.25 
-
3.59***  0.21 1.52 -0.30 
-
2.65***  -0.12 -0.21  -0.21 -0.83 0.03  0.18 
Peace and order problems  -0.23 -1.07  -0.47  -1.46 -0.70 
-
2.92*** 0.08  0.31  -1.03 
-
3.53*** 0.07  0.18  -0.87 
-
2.33*** -0.33 -0.51  0.42  1.26 
Idiosyncratic shocks 
Death of head or spouse  -0.04  -0.28  0.45  0.93  -0.18  -1.16  0.37  1.06  -0.25 
-
2.69*** -0.27  -0.89  -0.02  -0.14  -0.20  -1.63 
0.07 
 0.30 
Death of another person  0.05  0.52  0.53  2.50**  0.09  0.49  0.21  1.30  -0.10  -0.41  0.25  1.86*  0.03  0.11  0.04  0.27  0.07  0.38 
Illness of head or spouse  0.07  0.56  -0.04  -0.22  0.16  0.97  -0.13  -0.61  0.26  1.22  0.04  0.26  -0.13  -0.49  -0.06  -0.53  0.17  0.56 
Illness of another person  0.03  0.29  -0.33  -1.25  0.10  0.67  0.05  0.27  0.12  0.65  -0.16  -1.82*  0.24  1.10  0.05  0.29  0.03  0.21 
Shocks between 1984-1996 





3.52*** -0.12  -1.54  -0.17 
-
6.30*** 0.02  0.59  -0.11 
-
2.81*** -0.05  -0.97  -0.01  -0.07  -0.23 
-
2.85*** 
Excessive rain or flooding  0.12  1.70  0.00  -0.04  0.08  0.62  0.19  3.24***  -0.16  -1.03  -0.04  -0.46  0.23  0.87  -0.10  -0.71  0.14  0.63 
Crop and livestock pests 
and diseases  -0.01 -0.27  -0.29 
-
2.23***  0.06 0.93  -0.10  -1.07  0.03  0.35  -0.20 
-
3.91***  0.08 1.06  -0.03  -0.42  0.03  0.35 
Input shocks  0.05  0.52  0.54  4.70***  -0.64  -1.35  0.66  1.97**  -0.79 
-
3.92*** 0.29  1.33  -0.44  -0.72  -0.63 
-
1.67* 1.05  1.81* 
Output shocks  0.07  0.74  0.15  0.94  -0.02  -0.08  0.02  0.26  -0.37  -1.79*  0.12  1.20  0.02  0.16  0.00  -0.01  0.01  0.06 
Peace and order problems  -0.02  -0.23  0.03  0.11 0.13 0.71 -0.06  -0.25  0.32  1.50 0.15 0.86  -0.02  -0.06 0.36  1.72*  -0.13 -1.31 
Idiosyncratic shocks 
Death of head or spouse  -0.09  -0.82  0.08  0.40  -0.15  -1.10  0.38  1.38  -0.28 
-
2.61***  -0.05  -0.42  -0.17  -1.49 -0.14  -0.88  -0.01 -0.03 
Death of another person  0.10  0.61  0.58  3.41***  -0.03  -0.11  0.14  1.01  0.04  0.19  0.20  1.74*  -0.09  -0.42  0.11  0.83  0.03  0.11 
Illness of head or spouse  0.33  1.72*  -0.21  -0.75  0.34  1.11  0.24  2.21**  0.58  1.82*  -0.02  -0.16  0.36  1.50  0.15  0.74  0.63  2.23** 





Regressions included control variables as of 1984: log of age of the household head, years of schooling of the head, log of household size, 
dependency ratio, net worth, area cultivated, whether household head was Catholic, and whether the head was born in Misamis Oriental. 
Standard errors are calculated using the Huber-White method; municipality dummies are included but not reported. A constant term was 
estimated but not reported. 
*Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
***Significant at the 1% level 
Whether or not a household had land in 1984 refers to whether they had either owned or rented land 
Median land size in 1984 was 1.75 hectares 
Median net worth in 1984 was 7,580 pesos 




Not surprisingly, short- and longer-term impacts differ across household 
types. Similar to the results for all households, in almost all cases, the 1987-1988 
drought had a stronger impact compared to the 1997-1998 drought. The impact of 
the 1987-1988 drought was felt most strongly by households with no land in 1984, 
households with less than median landholdings, households with less than median 
net worth, and households with greater than median schooling. Crop and livestock 
pest and disease shocks experienced in the earlier period also had a more lasting 
impact on households without land and households with less than median net 
worth. Input shocks, however, significantly reduced per capita consumption 
significantly in both the later and earlier periods. Not surprisingly, the burden of 
input shocks in both periods was felt by households with land, those with greater 
than median land size, and those with greater than median assets, since these 
households are more likely to be engaged in agriculture. In contrast, a higher 
percentage of households reporting input shocks is associated with higher per 
capita consumption among households with no land, households with less than 
median land size, and households with greater than median schooling. These 
households are less likely to be agricultural producers and may in fact be net 
suppliers of labor or other farm inputs (in the case of those with greater than 
median schooling). Output shocks tended to have negligible impact in the earlier 
period, but had significant recent impacts on households without land, households 
with less than median landholdings, and households with less than median net 
worth. Peace and order problems had a significant impact in recent years, adversely 
affecting households with land, with greater than median landholdings, and greater 
than median net worth. Finally, among the idiosyncratic shocks, death of the head 
or spouse had a strong negative impact, regardless of whether it occurred in the 
later or earlier period. The seeming positive impact of illness on log per capita 
expenditures can be attributed to increased medical expenditures. 
5. GROUPS AND NETWORKS IN BUKIDNON, PHILIPPINES 
In this section, we describe the groups and networks observed in Bukidnon, 
Philippines (see Godquin and Quisumbing, 2006, 2007 for a more detailed 
exposition) and analyze the factors that influence group and network formation. As 
mentioned above, we use “groups” to refer to more formal and structured 
organizations and “networks” to denote more informal alliances. Respondents in the 
2003 round of the Philippine survey were asked about formal groups and informal 
networks to which they belonged. The group membership module asked the 
household members to list all the groups, associations, and cooperatives at least 
one household member belonged to. Households provided information on a total of 
689 groups, which were classified into production, credit, burial, religious, and civic 
groups. As a measure of social networks, households were also asked about the 
number of persons it can run to for help on specific occasions. These events 
mobilize different aspects of social capital, such as trust, mutual insurance, 
information-pooling, or copying. Trust-related questions dealt with care of the 
house, care of children, and family problems, while questions related to economic 
networks were related to networks for coping with economic loss, price information, 
and technology adoption. These questions were informed by discussion with Filipino  
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researchers who were familiar with the local culture and field tested by the 
authors.
8 
Table 5. Formal and informal networks of parent households, by 1984 












Formal groups          
Proportion of households participating in 
groups 0.76  0.56  0.75  0.80  0.84 
Total number of groups the household 
belongs to  1.57 1.00  1.41  1.53  2.05 
Proportion of households with at least 
one member in a group          
Production groups  0.27  0.06  0.14  0.30  0.46 
Credit groups  0.21  0.15  0.19  0.21  0.27 
Burial groups  0.31  0.27  0.29  0.34  0.33 
Religious groups  0.34  0.29  0.41  0.34  0.30 
Civic groups  0.15  0.13  0.18  0.09  0.19 
Networks          
Proportion of households with at least 
one person in a network          
All networks  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Specific networks          
Care of house  0.53  0.52  0.48  0.50  0.60 
Family problems  0.58  0.44  0.65  0.56  0.62 
Child care  0.52  0.51  0.48  0.50  0.59 
Economic loss  0.75  0.71  0.73  0.70  0.82 
Price information  0.69  0.75  0.62  0.65  0.75 
Technology adoption  0.48  0.55  0.40  0.44  0.54 
Total number of persons in the 
household’s network
9  13.21 11.23  11.97  13.21  15.32 
Size of specific networks (number of 
persons)          
Care of house  1.79  1.60  1.75  1.72  2.00 
Family problems  2.33  1.81  2.19  2.50  2.56 
Child care  1.66  1.54  1.66  1.68  1.73 
Economic loss  3.38  2.79  2.89  3.06  4.41 
Price information  2.40  2.29  1.93  2.49  2.68 
Technology adoption  1.80  1.64  1.68  1.72  1.98 
 
                                                      
 
8 See Godquin and Quisumbing (2006) for details and the exact wording of the questions.  
9 Defined as the sum of persons across all networks.  
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Households in the Philippines can count on various social and economic 
networks for support (see Table 5). Membership in groups is widespread, with 76 
percent of parent households belonging to at least one group. Parent households 
belong to an average of 1.6 groups, with the proportion of households belonging to 
at least one group and the average number of groups to which the household 
belongs increasing steadily with asset quartile.  
The types of groups households belong to are quite diversified compared to 
other countries where the most important groups are village women’s and/or men’s 
groups that engage in diversified activities (like in Senegal or in Kenya—see Kariuki 
and Place, 2005).
10 Religious groups are the most frequently mentioned groups, 
with 34 percent of the households belonging to at least one religious group. Civic 
groups are the least common type of group, with 15 percent of the households 
belonging to at least one such group. Household participation in religious, burial, 
and civic groups increases across asset quartiles, even though not steeply, but 
participation in production and credit groups increases markedly as wealth 
increases. This suggests that wealth may be a greater barrier to participation in 
economic versus non-economic groups. 
Households also belong to a number of diverse networks, dealing with social 
and economic matters. Table 5 presents information on the various networks 
households can rely on for help in specific matters. The “all networks” variable is 
the sum of persons in all of the household’s networks and could potentially 
overstate the size of the total network since it is possible that the same person may 
belong to more than one trust-based network.
11 Across quartiles, virtually all 
households reporting having at least one person they can turn to for help for 
various matters, although this may be an artifact of the definition of this variable. 
Looking at various types of networks, 75 percent of households report having a 
network to turn to in case of economic loss, with the highest asset quartile the best 
insured with respect to economic loss (82 percent of households report being able 
to turn to someone in case of severe economic losses, in contrast to 71 percent of 
households in the lowest quartile). Only 48 percent of households report having a 
network for technology adoption and copying—perhaps because farmers tend to 
rely on the formal extension system rather than their neighbors for information on 
new technologies. The study site is near an agricultural university that has active 
extension programs; also, the Department of Agriculture’s extension agents have 
regular technology dissemination activities. On average, the number of persons 
households can turn to in case of important economic loss is larger than for the 
other scenarios.  
                                                      
 
10 Godquin and Quisumbing (2006) investigate the determinants of men’s and women’s 
participation in groups. They find that while men and women have equal probabilities of participating 
in groups and belong to the same number of groups, men tend to belong to productive and burial 
groups, and women to civic and religious groups. 
11 Unlike in Ethiopia, we did not ask households to name the persons in their network, so we could 
not check whether the same person belonged to different types of networks.  
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Table 6. Determinants of the total number of groups, 2003
12 
  Tobit 
  All groups 
   Coeff  t 
Age of the household head. 2003  -0.015  -0.09 
Age squared  0.000  0.14 
Whether head completed secondary schooling (10 years or 
more)   2.92 
% household members with >=6 years of schooling, 1984    2.78 
Log of household size in 1984  0.283  0.89 
Dependency ratio in 1984  0.045  0.29 
Asset quartile in 1984, highest excluded     
 Lowest asset quartile  -0.825  -2.23 
 Second asset quartile  -0.692  -2.50 
 Third asset quartile  -0.786  -3.15 
 Whether agricultural producer in 1984 (a)  -0.169  -0.59 
 Whether household had a nonagricultural business, 1984  0.083  0.40 
 Head is Catholic, 1984  0.743  2.28 
 Distance to poblacion (town center), in km  -0.186  -5.59 
 Number of shocks, 1984-2002  0.134  1.99 
Barangay-level variables     
 Origin heterogeneity  0.682  0.82 
 Ethnic heterogeneity  -1.596  -3.15 
 Asset heterogeneity  -0.759  -3.22 
 Education heterogeneity  -2.436  -1.89 
 Percent households affected by peace/order problems  0.004  1.86 
Programs operating in barangay, 2000-2001     
 Cooperatives  -0.674  -3.31 
 Nongovernmental organizations  -0.159  -0.85 
 Government organizations  0.061  0.44 
Mean of total value of non-land assets, 1984, household 
excluded -0.002  -1.38 
Constant  3.829  0.83 
Sigma  1.462  20.85 
Number of observations  311  
Left-censored observations  75  
Uncensored observations  236  
Wald chi2(23)  142.62  
Prob > chi2   0  
Pseudo R2   0.1281   
                                                      
 
12 Notes: z-values and t-statistics in bold are significant at 10 percent or better.  
 
19 
While it might seem that membership in groups and the size of one’s 
networks increase with asset ownership, these differences in means might also 
arise from characteristics of households that also affect their propensity to join 
groups. Thus, we explore the determinants of group membership and network size 
using econometric analysis. We investigate the impact of household physical and 
human capital as well as various aspects on village heterogeneity on membership in 
groups and networks, controlling for individual, household, and community 
characteristics. Among the community characteristics of interest are measures of 
heterogeneity at the village level, following Alesina and La Ferrara (2000). These 
are measures of ethnic, origin, education, and asset heterogeneity. We also include 
(from the community questionnaire) the cumulative proportion of households 
affected by peace and order problems since 1984, and programs operating in the 
barangay the previous year (2000-2001). 
Table 6 presents a tobit regression of the determinants of the total number 
of groups that a household belongs to. Both human capital and physical capital of 
the households are strongly associated with the accumulation of formal social 
capital. Whether the head completed secondary schooling and the percentage of 
household members with greater than primary schooling positively and significantly 
affect the total number of groups to which the household belongs. Relative to the 
highest asset quartile, household belonging to the lower asset quartiles belong to 
fewer groups. Catholic households also belong to more groups, a result that is 
driven by membership in religious groups. Not surprisingly, distance from the town 
center reduces the total number of groups to which the household belongs. 
Households that experienced more negative shocks in the past also belong to more 
groups, possibly indicating that groups may perform an insurance function. 
Group membership is lower in villages with higher ethnic diversity and higher 
asset heterogeneity, while education heterogeneity has a weak negative effect. 
Political unrest has a weak positive impact on the number of groups the household 
belongs to, while the number of cooperatives has a strong negative effect. The 
unexpected impact of cooperatives on the number of groups can be explained by 
the negative reputation of the cooperatives movement in the Philippines. 
Cooperatives have often been formed for political purposes, as the cooperatives 
movement in the Philippines has risen and fallen depending on support from 
government officials.
13  
We also examine the determinants of participating in specific groups; 
detailed results are reported in Godquin and Quisumbing (2007). Consistent with 
the results for group membership in total, wealthier households are more likely to 
take part in productive groups. Not surprisingly, households engaged in agricultural 
or nonagricultural production are more likely to be members of productive groups, 
with being an agricultural producer having a greater marginal impact. Interestingly, 
none of the measures of village-level heterogeneity have a significant impact on 
membership in productive groups. The household’s position in the asset distribution 
                                                      
 
13 Cooperatives were encouraged during the Marcos regime, for example, especially for agrarian 
reform beneficiaries. Many of these cooperatives fell into disarray in subsequent years. The 
cooperatives movement paled in comparison to the rise of NGOs during the Aquino administration, but 
seems to have recovered with support from the Ramos administration.  
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also has a significant impact on the probability of joining a credit group, with the 
second and third asset quartiles significantly less likely to join a credit group 
relative to the wealthiest quartile. Both ethnic and educational heterogeneity have a 
negative impact on participation in credit groups. It is possible that having a similar 
level of education is a precondition for being able to rely on other group members 
to manage money together, or having similar ethnic backgrounds enables group 
members to form and manage groups more efficiently. We find that group 
participation declines in villages with more cooperatives. Perhaps the high number 
of cooperatives operating in the village is a signal of coordination difficulties. It is 
also possible that because members of cooperatives can avail of credit from the 
cooperative, they do not feel the need to participate in stand-alone credit groups. 
Lastly, a high incidence of peace and order problems diminishes participation in 
credit groups, perhaps due to increased uncertainty. 
Burial groups are important risk-sharing institutions in the rural Philippines 
and are found in almost all Philippine communities. In comparison to production 
and credit groups, being less wealthy does not seem to pose a significant barrier to 
participation in both burial and religious groups. Indeed, participation in burial 
groups is higher in barangays with a lower average value of non-land assets, 
possibly because households in poorer communities, which may not have the 
resources to independently finance burial expenses, have a greater incentive to 
participate in such groups. Participation in burial groups also crosses occupational 
categories, with households in different occupational categories having no 
significant difference in participation. Catholics are more likely to take part in burial 
groups. Village heterogeneity dampens the desire to join burial groups: ethnic and 
asset heterogeneity have a negative significant impact on the probability of joining 
a burial group. A higher incidence of peace and order problems increases the 
likelihood of joining burial groups. Even if peace and order problems do not directly 
affect the mortality rate of the village, they can increase residents’ perception of 
uncertainty and their desire to insure against adverse events. 
Compared to production, credit, or burial groups, religious and civic groups 
do not focus on economic motives. Nevertheless, households with more human 
capital are more likely to participate in religious and civic groups. Interestingly, 
participation in religious groups does not differ across asset quartiles. Origin 
heterogeneity weakly reduces participation in civic groups, some of which are 
organized around different regional groupings (for example, a Boholano group, 
composed of migrants from Bohol), but ethnic heterogeneity increases the 
probability of joining a civic group.  
Does participation in formal groups substitute for informal trust-based 
networks? Group membership can both increase the size of one’s network and be 
facilitated by one’s network if members of networks have better access to 
information or if membership in one group is restricted to acquaintances of current 
group members. Alternatively, membership in formal groups could substitute for 
informal networks if households turn to formal institutions to provide services—e.g., 
risk-sharing, credit, insurance—that were formerly provided through one’s informal 
social network. To investigate this issue, we estimate a regression on the size of a 
household’s network, defined as the sum of the number of persons that a 
household can run to for help. As mentioned above, this variable may overestimate 
the number of persons who can actually assist a household, since it would double- 
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count persons who provide help in different ways. To address the issue of double 
counting, we also estimate regressions separately for each type of network, but 
report the results only for total network size here. 
Table 7. Determinants of the sum of all networks
14 
  Sum of all networks 
Variables 
OLS  
Coeff   z 
IV 
Coeff z 
Number of groups in 2003 (endogenous in IV)  0.015  0.07  0.080  0.13 
Age of household head  0.121  1.22  0.116  1.23 
Education of head in 1984  0.394  2.61  0.391  2.12 
Log of household size in 2003  0.286  0.18  0.236  0.16 
Percentage of household members in 2003:       
 Aged 0 to 14  0.295  0.13  0.603  0.28 
 Aged 15 to 19  -1.148  -0.45  0.988  -0.42 
 Aged 55 and over  2.706  1.01  2.873  1.18 
Total asset value in 1984  0.008  1.99  0.008  2.24 
Other household characteristics         
 Number of shocks, 1985-2003   0.465  1.65  0.470  1.67 
Indices of barangay heterogeneity       
 Origin hetetoregeneity  1.718  0.46  1.656  0.39 
 Asset heterogeneity (1984)  -2.004  -1.14  1.632  -0.83 
 Ethnicity of the household head   0.001  0.64  0.001  0.76 
 Education of the household head  0.115  0.29  0.068  0.18 
Location of children living outside the household       
 Number of daughters living outside village  -0.539  -2.15  0.538  -2.09 
 Number of daughters living in the village   0.060  0.09  0.105  0.16 
 Number of sons living outside the village   -0.214  -0.70  0.206  -0.68 
 Number of sons living in the village   0.925  1.38  0.866  1.34 
 Constant  1.672  0.24  1.902  0.28 
       
Number of obs  304    304   
F( 17, 29)  7.36    8.26   
Prob > F    0.00    0.00   
Centered R2   0.13    0.13   
Uncentered R2      0.79   
Root MSE    7.20   6.98  
Test of exogeneity: H0: Regressor is exogenous         
 Wu-Hausman F test (p-value_      0.022  0.88 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square test (p-value)      0.023  0.88 
                                                      
 
14 Notes: Regressions estimated with attrition weights; standard errors robust to clustering within 
barangays; z-values in bold indicate significance at 10 percent or better.  
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Instrumental variables diagnostics         
Shea partial R-2 test (F, p-value)      15.90  0.00 
Anderson identification/IV relevance test (Chi-2, p-
value)     59.77  0.00 
Hansen-J statistic (overid test) (Chi-2, p-value)        9.71  0.21 
 
Household network density can be modeled as a function of household 
characteristics and village-level attributes. Household characteristics include the 
age and education level of the household head, household size, household 
demographic composition, asset position, and the number of shocks experienced 
since 1984. Because personal relationships may affect network formation more 
than economic considerations (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007), we include measures 
of kinship relationships within and outside the village: the number of sons and 
daughters living inside and outside the village. We also include the measures of 
village-level heterogeneity described above.  
An underlying question is whether participation in groups increases network-
based social capital. We treat participation in groups as endogenous, using as 
instruments variables that affect whether households join groups, but which do not 
affect the size of the network. These variables are whether the household is a sugar 
producer, whether the head was Catholic in 1984, barangay heterogeneity indices 
in 1984, per capita expenditures on groups in 1984, and the barangay mean 
number of groups, excluding the household. Both OLS and instrumental variables 
estimates, in which group membership is treated as endogenous, are presented in 
Table 7; exogeneity tests lead us to accept the null hypothesis that the number of 
groups is exogenous. 
Surprisingly, the total number of groups to which a household belongs does 
not affect the density of its networks. Human capital and physical capital contribute 
to the size of social networks: education of the household head and total asset 
value in 1984 both have positive and significant coefficients. There is some weak 
indication that networks perform a risk-smoothing function, since the number of 
shocks experienced since 1984 increases the number of persons that one can turn 
to for help. Interestingly, the number of daughters living outside the villages exerts 
a strong negative influence on the size of one’s local trust-based networks. 
Do these results hold for different types of networks? Regressions not 
reported here examine the determinants of the size of three different types of social 
networks (care of house, family problems, and childcare) and three types of 
economic networks (networks related to economic loss, price information, and 
technology information), with the number of groups as one of the regressors 
(treated as endogenous). What is remarkable in all these regressions is that the 
number of groups is almost always insignificant, indicating that the number of 
groups a household belongs to does not significantly impact the formation of social 
and economic networks. Unlike the regressions on group membership, very few 
variables related to the economic status of the household are significant in the 
economic network variables. Households that are wealthier, as indicated by total 
asset value in 1984, are slightly more likely to have larger networks that insure 
against economic loss, while asset heterogeneity of the barangay reduces the size 
of these networks. Networks for price information may be driven by risk-pooling 
considerations, with households experiencing more negative shocks since 1984  
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having larger networks for price information. However, a striking finding, similar to 
the findings of Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), is the importance of pre-existing 
personal relationships as drivers of economic trust-based networks. Networks 
related to price information and new technologies are smaller, the larger the 
number of daughters living outside the village. The network for new technologies, 
however, is positively associated with the number of sons living inside the village, 
but in separate households.  
Our findings suggest that sons and daughters perform different functions in 
social and economic networks—a finding that can be traced to the different roles of 
men and women in Filipino society. Daughters are trained to be responsible and 
often play the role of insurers, migrating to towns and cities and then sending 
remittances to their origin households (Lauby and Stark, 1988). The number of 
daughters living outside the village negatively affects the combined number of 
persons in all networks and the number of people in price-information and 
technology-adoption networks. Perhaps daughters living outside the village are a 
reliable source of information about price trends and new technologies. In contrast, 
sons who are living in separate households within the village are more likely to be 
engaged in agricultural production themselves and are a local source of technology 
information for parents.  
While the total number of groups does not capture differences in group 
objectives, which could affect network density depending on the type of network, 
the results of regressions not reported here do not show a consistent impact of 
membership in a particular group on the size of a particular network.
15 In almost all 
cases, the coefficient of membership in a specific group is insignificant. We 
therefore conclude that different motivations drive participation in groups and in 
social networks, and that formal group membership neither substitutes for nor 
encourages the formation of trust-based networks. Because trust-based networks 
tend to be based on personal relationships (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007), 
economic factors are not the most important determinants of such networks. 
6. ECONOMIC RETURNS TO GROUPS AND NETWORKS IN THE PHILIPPINES 
The regressions on group membership and on total network size suggest that 
negative shocks increase households’ participation in groups and the size of one’s 
network. In the present analysis, we do not provide definitive evidence that 
participation in groups and networks reduces the impact of shocks in the 
Philippines. Rather, we explore whether participation in groups yields economic 
returns in terms of increased per capita expenditures, the extent to which migrant 
networks form in response to shocks, and their possible impact on sending 
households.  
                                                      
 
15 In most cases, the first-stage diagnostics suggest that the instrument set is weak. Alternatively, 
where the Cragg-Donald statistics are in an acceptable range, we reject the over identification test.  
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Table 8. Impact of group membership on per capita expenditures: Total 
number of groups
16 
  OLS   IV 
Variables Coeff  z      Coeff  z 
Total number of groups (endogenous)  0.127  5.07    0.163  3.99 
Age of household head  0.015  1.81    0.015  1.87 
Log household size in 1984  -0.237  -1.55    -0.240  -1.68 
Dependency ratio in 1984  -0.143  -2.71    -0.149  -2.81 
Household head has elementary schooling  0.176  2.05    0.170  2.07 
Household head has secondary schooling or better  0.304  3.12    0.267  2.50 
Asset quartiles in 1984, lowest excluded           
Lowest quartile  -0.412  -3.19    -0.380  -3.15 
Second quartile  -0.350  -3.54    -0.328  -3.36 
Third quartile  -0.142  -1.41    -0.121  -1.28 
Area of titled land in 2003  0.039  8.06    0.039  8.33 
Barangay average area of titled land, household 
excluded  0.030  2.15    0.034  2.46 
Agricultural household in 2003  0.005  0.11    0.002 0.04 
Household has nonagricultural business in 2003  0.080  1.00    0.070 0.87 
Constant 5.605  13.75    5.560  14.08 
         
Number of obs  304     304   
F( 13, 29)  57.90    42.53   
Prob > F    0.00     0.00   
R-squared 0.44        
Test of exogeneity: H0: Regressor is exogenous          
Wu-Hausman F test (p-value)       0.94 0.33 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square test       0.99 0.32 
Instrumental variables diagnostics         
F-test on excluded instruments (F-test, p-value)       21.38 0.00 
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic (identification/IV relevance test) (Chi-2, p 
value)  85.008 0.00 
Hansen J-statistic (overidentification test) (Chi-2, 
p-value)           8.162  0.32 
 
To explore whether group membership generates economic returns, we 
estimate the impact of group membership—the total number of groups—on per 
                                                      
 
16 Notes: Instrumental variables estimates with attrition weights; standard errors robust to 
clustering within barangay; t-statistics and z-values in bold are significant at 10% or better. 
Excluded instruments: Whether household is a sugar producer, whether head was Catholic in 
1984, barangay heterogeneity indices in 1984: origin, ethnicity, assets, and education, per capita 




capita expenditures using 2SLS to control for the potential endogeneity of group 
membership. As in the preceding section, we investigate whether the number of 
groups to which the household belongs has an impact on per capita expenditures.
17 
We regress log per capita expenditures on human capital of the household head 
(age in 2003, whether the household head completed primary education, whether 
he completed secondary education), household demographics (log household size 
and dependency ratio in 1984), asset quartiles in 1984, the area of titled land in 
2003, the barangay average of titled land in 2003 (excluding the household), and 
dummies for productive status.
18  
Both OLS and IV estimates are reported in Table 8, with exogeneity tests 
leading us to accept the null hypothesis that the total number of groups can be 
taken as exogenous in a regression on per capita expenditures. The total number of 
groups to which a household belongs has a positive and significant impact on log 
per capita expenditures, while the signs of the other coefficients are as expected. 
However, the total number of groups might mask the impact of individual groups. 
Since participation in economic oriented groups might have a higher impact on per 
capita expenditures, we also explore alternative specifications where group 
membership reflects group membership in production, credit, burial, religious, and 
civic groups, respectively. These results, which are not reported here, suggest that 
membership in burial, religious, and civic groups have a significant positive impact 
on per capita expenditures. 
We are unable to investigate whether social networks also yield economic 
benefits because we lack credible instruments that affect social networks but do not 
directly affect per capita expenditures. Insights from the qualitative work conducted 
among respondent households that experienced covariate and idiosyncratic shocks, 
however, suggest that local networks only have a limited ability to help households 
cope with shocks. Several respondents mentioned that they feel embarrassed to 
ask for help from their friends and neighbors, who are also poor and also face 
similar problems—even in the case of a household-specific shock such as illness 
(prior to the introduction of government-provided health insurance). Local networks 
can offer limited support in the case of a covariate shock. When faced with negative 
shocks, households use a variety of coping mechanisms: working harder, relying on 
help from children who have left the home and who are now working, borrowing 
money from informal sources, and selling or mortgaging assets. 
Studies of collective action typically focus on nonfamilial groups. However, 
both the anthropological (see the review by Arce, 2003) and the economic literature 
on the Philippines suggests that kinship affects participation in groups notably risk-
sharing networks (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007). The 
findings from our analysis of trust-based networks also suggest that “migration 
                                                      
 
17 Results using expenditures per adult equivalent yield similar results that are not reported here; 
we discuss per capita expenditures for comparability with other studies. 
18 The set of excluded instruments in the instrumental variables regressions are variables 
explaining various forms of group membership that do not directly affect per capita expenditure; the 
choice of these variables was motivated by the previous analysis of group membership. These 
excluded instruments are whether the household is a sugar producer, whether the head was Catholic 
in 1984, barangay heterogeneity indices in 1984, per capita expenditures on groups in 1984, and the 
barangay mean number of groups, excluding the household.  
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capital” and “local” social capital are substitutes. Given these findings, we examine 
the role of familial migrant networks in consumption smoothing. In our study 
sample, close to half—47 percent—of children 15 and older are migrants to rural, 
peri-urban, and urban areas in the Philippines as well as overseas. Similar to the 
national pattern, a higher proportion of migrants is female. Households with 
migrant children may invest less in local social capital because they can rely on 
transfers from their migrant children, particularly their daughters. We investigate 
this by examining the impact of migration and remittances, both endogenously 
determined, on various measures of well-being of parent households (this draws 
from Quisumbing and McNiven, 2007). 
Table 9 presents estimates of the probability of having an adult migrant child 
(21 years and older), the number of migrants age 21 and above, the probability of 
receiving remittances from outside the barangay, and the amount received. 
Marginal effects are presented—that is, the change in the dependent variable 
resulting from a one unit change in the regressor. We find that both household and 
community characteristics play an important role in the migration decision. While 
the education of the household head has a weak negative impact on the number of 
adult migrants, higher educational attainment of the children themselves increases 
both the probability of migrating and the stock of migrants, with daughters’ 
completed schooling having a larger impact than sons’. Villages that have been 
connected to the main highway for a longer time tend to have fewer migrants, 
perhaps because workers can commute to the town center instead of having to 
relocate, but villages that have had electricity for longer durations tend to have 
more migrants. Finally, the percentage of migrants from other households in the 
barangay exerts a negative influence on both the probability of migration and the 
number of migrants. This last result is somewhat counterintuitive because other 
studies (see, for example, Winters et al., 2000) have shown that potential migrants 
in communities with larger numbers of migrants are able to take advantage of 
information networks formed by former migrants. However, in communities where 
a large number of families are related and where migration rates are already high, 
there may be diminishing returns to additional migration.  
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Table 9. Determinants of the probability of having a migrant child, total number of migrants, the 
probability of receiving remittances and total remittances received
19 
      Parents who were reinterviewed in 2003   
  Probability of 









  Probit 
Total 
remittances 
received   
      Tobit 
   dF/dx z  dy/dx z  dF/dx z  dy/dx  z 
Age of household head in 2003  0.057  2.05  0.190 1.57 -0.094  -2.00  -1.407 -0.77 
Age squared  0.000  -1.68  -0.001 -0.79  0.001  2.02  0.011 0.69 
Education of household head  -0.001 -0.19 -0.054  -1.68  0.005 0.43 0.556 1.14 
Ln net worth in 1984/85  -0.009  -0.53  -0.105  -1.32  -0.032  -1.22  -0.418  -0.35 
Area cultivated in 1984/85  -0.004  -0.68  0.016  0.53  -0.003  -0.31  0.386  0.86 
Distance to town center  0.001  0.22  0.020  0.69  -0.009  -1.02  -0.693  -1.66 
Cumulative shocks, 1984-2002  0.018  1.10  0.085  1.13  0.090  3.44  1.997  1.74 
Number of sons 21 and older  0.006  0.44  -0.018  -0.32  -0.013  -0.69  -1.317  -1.57 
Number of daughters 21 and older  -0.010  -0.92  0.048  0.89  -0.014  -0.78  -0.030  -0.04 
Mean education of sons 21 and older  0.013  2.45  0.077  3.06  0.011 1.26 0.647 1.60 
Mean education of daughters 21 and older  0.021  4.65  0.111  5.39  0.013  1.80  0.807  2.45 
Duration of road connecting village to town  -0.004  -2.08  -0.013  -1.87  0.006  2.36  0.327  2.87 
Duration village was electrified  0.009  2.18  0.046  2.51  -0.023  -3.50  -1.088  -3.80 
Percentage of migrants from other households in 
village -0.004  -2.68  -0.029  -3.86         
Percent deviation from trend GDP in 2002, male 
migrants         0.042  2.13  1.420  1.88 
Percent deviation from trend GDP in 2002, female 
migrants         0.075  4.04  1.988  2.91 
                                                      
 
19 Notes: z-values in bold are significant at 10% or better. 
Probit z values computed using robust standard errors.  
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Observed probability  0.80        0.61       
Predicted probability  0.88        0.64       
Left censored observations      59       111   
Uncensored observations      236        184   
                
Number of obs  295    295    295    295   
LR chi2(18)   70.24   155.81   53.24  55.69   
Prob > chi2   0.00   0.00  0.00   0.00   




While parental wealth affects neither the probability of receipts nor the 
amount received, remittances appear to perform a consumption-smoothing 
function. Cumulative shocks up to 2002 increase both the likelihood of receiving 
remittances and amounts received. Schooling attainment of daughters, but not of 
sons, increases both the probability of receipt and amounts received. This is 
consistent with previous studies (Lauby and Stark, 1988; Quisumbing, 1997) 
showing that females, particularly better-educated females, are more likely to make 
remittances to parents. While positive shocks to migrant incomes increase both the 
probability of receipt and amounts received, the marginal effects of shocks 
experienced by daughters are larger than those of sons. A one percent positive 
deviation from GDP in a region where a migrant son was located would increase 
remittance receipts by 1,420 pesos; if the one percent positive shock occurred in a 
region where a daughter lived, it would increase remittances by 1,988 pesos. These 
results support our earlier findings that parents invest less in local networks if they 
have more daughters living outside the village. 
How do migration and remittances affect parent households? Table 10 
presents the coefficient estimates on the number of migrants age 21 years and 
above, and remittances on various outcomes of the parental household. Both 
migration and remittances are treated as endogenous in the IV regressions.
20 Our 
estimates suggest that investment in migrant networks involves tradeoffs. The 
number of migrants has significant negative impacts on expenditures on clothing 
and footwear, family events, alcohol and tobacco, and a weak negative impact on 
health expenditures (all per adult equivalent). Remittances, on the other hand, 
have significant positive impacts on housing and consumer durables, and the total 
value of nonland assets and total expenditure per adult equivalent. Similarly, 
expenditures on clothing and footwear, education, and alcohol and tobacco increase 
significantly with remittances. Clearly, financing educational expenditures of family 
members is an important use of remittances. These positive impacts on productive 
assets and schooling mirror the findings of Yang (2004), who finds that favorable 
exchange rate shocks for overseas Filipino migrants lead to greater child schooling, 
reduced child labor, and increased educational expenditure in origin households.  
                                                      
 
20 See Quisumbing and McNiven (2007) for more detail on the IV regressions.   
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Table 10. Impact of migration and remittances on asset holdings and 
consumption expenditures of parent households
21 
  Coefficient on number 
of migrants 
Coefficient on 
remittances   
  IV   IV 
Outcome Coeff  z      Coeff  z    
Assets in 2003           
Farm and business equipment  -0.219  -0.01    2.158 1.43   
Livestock -0.865  -0.80    0.127 1.40   
Housing and consumer durables  -46.555 
-
2.01    5.127  2.14   
Total nonland assets  -184.311 
-
1.67    12.677  1.81   
Value of land   -136.673  -1.52    5.266 1.17   
Value of land and assets  -320.984  -1.62    17.943 1.59   
           
Expenditures per adult equivalent 
in 2003           
Total expenditure  -136.786 
-
2.74    8.855  1.97   
Food -21.113  -1.53    1.136 1.27   
Clothing and footwear  -5.366 
-
1.97    0.636  3.06   
Health -13.058 
-
1.79    0.625 1.44   
Education -13.636  -1.16    2.276  2.60   
Family events  -23.821 
-
2.10    1.313 1.53   
Alcohol and tobacco  -4.467 
-
3.37    0.255  2.11   
          
Partial R-2 of excluded instruments  0.243     0.0647    
F-test of excluded instruments  20.31    2.200    
p-value  0.00     0.05    
                                                      
 
21 Notes: Instrumental variables regressions estimated with attrition weights; standard errors are 
robust to clustering within villages. Regressors in outcome equation: age of household head, age 
squared, education of household head, in net worth in round 1 of 1984/85, area cultivated in round 1, 
1984, distance to town center, males older than 15 in household, females older than 15 in household, 
household members 15 and younger, cumulative shocks up to 2002 
Instruments: Sons 21 years and older, daughters 21 years and older, duration village connected 
to main road, duration village was electrified, average completed years of schooling of sons and 
daughters 21 and over, percent GDP deviation of migrant sons, percent GDP deviation of migrant 




Cragg-Donald weak identification 
statistic   2.090          
Anderson canonical correlation LR 
statistic 19.56          
p-value  0.01          
z-values and p-values in bold indicate significance at 10% or 
better          
 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Using longitudinal data from Bukidnon, Philippines, followed up by focused 
qualitative work in the survey villages, we have attempted to understand the role of 
groups and networks in determining how the poor manage their exposure to risks 
and cope with shocks to their livelihoods. Aside from determining the impact of 
shocks on consumption, and how these may vary across different types of 
households, our analysis allows us to arrive at some conclusions regarding the role 
of asset endowments and heterogeneity in network formation and risk-smoothing, 
and the role of different types of enforcement mechanisms so that the network can 
achieve its risk-smoothing objectives.  
Drought and the death of the household head or spouse have significant 
impacts on the well-being of Filipino households. While drought has a negative 
impact on all households, it has a significant negative impact on households with 
less land and assets. Death of a household head or spouse has a stronger negative 
impact on per capita consumption for households that have more land and assets—
probably because these households are more heavily engaged in agriculture.  
Accumulation of social capital comes easier to the wealthy. This finding is 
important to development agencies that deliver services through groups or that 
encourage the poor to invest in “social capital” because it is easier to acquire than 
physical assets: the poor are disadvantaged even in the acquisition of social capital. 
However, participation in less economically-oriented groups such as religious and 
civic groups, as well as insurance groups like burial groups, is less closely 
associated with initial wealth than participation in production and credit groups. 
Burial groups not only serve an important insurance function, but also seem to 
reach a wide spectrum of society. 
Different aspects of heterogeneity matter in the formation and conduct of 
collective action institutions. Disparities in ethnicity, assets, and education at the 
village level are likely to discourage the formation of groups, although they do not 
affect the formation of trust-based networks. Thus, external heterogeneity is not 
necessarily “good” for social capital formation; this may partially explain the 
difficulty of some collective action efforts in the Philippines, which has a highly 
unequal income distribution. However, heterogeneity with respect to location may 
be important in insurance against covariate shocks.  
Networks composed of spatially-diversified children perform an important 
insurance function against covariate shocks that may not be achievable by local 
networks. While spatially-diversified networks might offer more insurance against 
covariate shocks, problems of asymmetric information are greater. It is therefore 
no surprise that in the Philippines migrant networks are composed primarily of  
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family members (children) since norms are easier to enforce within the family. 
Children, especially daughters, are socialized to have utang na loob, a debt of 
gratitude in the form of reciprocity for favors granted (Lopez, 1991). As part of 
utang na loob children must obey and respect their parents and fulfill their 
obligations long after parents have reared them to maturity. Indeed, children are 
expected to be everlastingly grateful to their parents not only for raising them, but 
more fundamentally for giving them life itself (Racelis Hollnsteiner, 1973). Failure 
to live up to these obligations is severely sanctioned, even with threats of divine 
retribution.
22 Thus, children, even those who live far away, continue to contribute to 
their parents. 
Because shocks can have adverse consequences in both the short and long 
term, understanding the appropriate role for public policy is important for 
sustainable poverty reduction. Policies to help poor households cope with shocks 
must take into account Filipino social and organizational culture since policies that 
are not mindful of the social context may backfire by eroding indigenous social 
support mechanisms. These results suggest a number of policy implications. First, 
development practitioners and policymakers need to be more realistic about the 
possibility of using collective action to deliver services directly to the poor or 
encouraging the asset-poor to accumulate social capital. Identifying those barriers 
that prevent the poor from participating in collective action is an important task for 
development practitioners. Poorer folk often express hiya (in Tagalog) or kaulaw (in 
Cebuano-Visayan, the language spoken by our respondents), literally translated as 
shame, but actually meaning the uncomfortable feeling that one is in a socially 
unacceptable position (Lynch, 1973) when approaching wealthier individuals for 
help in time of need. Fear of being unable to reciprocate may also prevent poorer 
households from approaching richer households for help since reciprocity is at the 
core of Filipino social transactions (Racelis Hollsteiner, 1973). Such feelings of 
discomfort may interfere with efforts to have a more heterogeneous mix of 
households in groups—and to achieve consumption-smoothing within formal 
groups. Such shame may be tempered if the richer individual is a relative, even a 
distant one. Thus, it is not uncommon for kinship networks to perform 
consumption-smoothing functions.  
Second, because local networks and other forms of collective action have 
limited effectiveness when there are covariate shocks, this is the appropriate arena 
for public policy. Even if migrant remittances may respond to covariate shocks, 
substantial time lags may be involved, and not all households in a locality may have 
access to migrant remittances. Third, certain types of networks do provide 
insurance against some types of idiosyncratic shocks such as illness, and these tend 
to be the sort of shocks where, because of information asymmetries, public action 
may tend to be less effective. Consideration should be given to thinking of public 
action as taking on an enabling role; examples of this in the Philippines include 
facilitating interventions (such as improvements in information and communications 
technology, or reducing transactions costs in making remittances) that lower the 
                                                      
 
22 Among various Bisayan-speaking groups, such as those in our study sites, failure to look after 
aging parents is sanctioned by gaba, or divine retribution. However, few persons attribute illness to 
gaba, or to gaba from that cause, which can be interpreted to mean that children actually live up to 
their obligations! (Lopez, 1991:8).  
 
33 
costs associated with developing and maintaining family networks. In the 
Philippines, for example, it is now possible to make bank payments and remittances 
by sending a text message using a cell phone. Finally, public policy needs to be 
aware of indigenous networks that already exist and ensure that government action 
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